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1.  Introduction. 
One of the most popular suggestions for the norm of assertion is the knowledge norm. Some 
hold that knowledge is necessary for proper assertion – one ought: assert that p only if one 
knows that p. Others endorse a bi-conditional norm: one is in a good enough epistemic 
position to assert that p if and only if one knows that p. However, the knowledge norm faces 
intuitive counterexamples. In some of these alleged counterexamples, it seems fine for a 
subject to assert that p even though she doesn’t know that p; in other alleged 
counterexamples, it seems problematic for a subject to assert that p even when she does know 
that p. Defenders of the knowledge norm have responded by appealing to the distinction 
between whether one conforms to a norm and whether one is blameworthy: one can violate a 
norm and yet be blameless or conform to it but nonetheless be blameworthy. Furthermore, 
some suggest that it’s futile to search for a norm such that whether one conforms to the norm 
aligns with whether one is blameless. They appeal to the failure of luminosity to defend the 
pessimistic conclusion that, for any norm whatsoever, the notions of norm conformity and 
being blameworthy can come apart.1 
                                                          
1 Thanks to Dan Greco for suggesting I should connect my work on blame with the argument 
for the pessimistic conclusion. Thanks for useful comments on various versions of this paper 
from Sandy Goldberg, Mona Simeon, my colleagues at St Andrews and the audience at the 
Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Society 2017. 
2 
 
In this paper, I assess this defence of the knowledge norm of assertion. I criticise the 
argument from the failure of luminosity to the pessimistic conclusion and argue that there is 
no easy way to reformulate it successfully. The discussion of the pessimistic conclusion 
distinguishes a variety of different explanations of how norm-conformity can come apart 
from whether one is blameless, and the limitations of these explanations. Thus, it also 
provides some guidance on when it is reasonable to defend the knowledge norm of assertion 
against counterexample by appeal to the distinction between norm-conformity and whether 
one is blameless. 
 
2.  Defending the knowledge norm. 
It’s become recently popular to defend the idea that knowledge is the norm of assertion. 
Some defend the idea that knowledge is necessary for appropriate assertion: one ought to 
assert that p only if one knows that p. Others defend a bi-conditional version of the 
knowledge norm: one is in a good enough epistemic position to assert that p if and only if one 
knows that p. The knowledge norm is motivated by a variety of data. This includes the 
infelicity of asserting “p but I don’t know that p”; the propriety of challenging the assertion 
that p by the questions, “How do you know that p?” and “Do you know that p?”; and, the 
infelicity of asserting lottery propositions (Williamson 2000). 
However, the idea that knowledge is the norm of assertion faces objections to both its 
necessity and sufficiency direction. In some cases, it seems fine for a subject to assert that p 
even though she doesn’t know that p, such as Gettier cases and cases in which a subject 
justifiably falsely believes that p. In other cases, it seems problematic for a subject to assert 
that p even though she does know that p. For instance, in Lackey’s second-hand knowledge 
case, it seems problematic for a surgeon to flat-out assert to her patient that she has cancer 
when she hasn’t looked at the patient’s notes but has merely learnt this information from the 
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testimony of a junior. Another class of potential counterexamples involve cases in which a 
subject plausibly knows but is nonetheless in such a high-stakes situation that it seems 
inappropriate for her to assert the relevant claim. For instance, even if a doctor knows on the 
basis of the morning clinic that it is the patient’s left kidney which is diseased, it seems that 
she should check the patient’s notes again rather than straight out assert this in the context of 
the afternoon operation to remove the diseased kidney (Brown 2010; for similar cases see 
Reed). A last set of cases are generated by the controversial view that one can maintain 
knowledge that p despite receiving what many regard as defeating evidence, say evidence 
that not-p, evidence that the process which produced the belief that p is unreliable, or 
evidence that one’s evidence does not support that p (e.g Lasonen-Aarnio 2010, forthcoming; 
Hawthorne and Srinavasan 2013). In these cases, too, it seems problematic for one to assert 
that p even though one (allegedly) knows that p. 
In response to these putative counterexamples, defenders of the knowledge norm have 
appealed to the idea that whether one conforms to a norm can come apart from whether one is 
blameworthy (Williamson 2000, Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, Hawthorne and Srinivasan 
2013). To the extent that one can violate the knowledge norm blamelessly, perhaps this 
explains our intuitions about cases in which a subject lacks knowledge that p but it 
nonetheless seems fine for her to assert that p. To the extent that one can conform to the 
knowledge norm in a blameworthy way, perhaps this could explain some of the cases in 
which a subject knows that p but it seems problematic for her to assert that p. Further, some 
argue for the pessimistic conclusion that, for any norm whatsoever, whether one conforms to 
that norm can come apart from whether one is blameworthy (Hawthorne and Srinivasan 
2013). 
 For this defence of the knowledge norm to be legitimate we need an account of when 
one is blameless for violating a norm or blameworthy for conforming to it. For otherwise, it’s 
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hard to assess whether the right response to the putative counterexamples is to retain the 
norm and chalk them up to the distinction between norm conformity and whether one is 
blameworthy or, instead, revise the formulation of the relevant norm. Indeed, without an 
account of when one is blameless for norm violations or blameworthy for norm conformity, 
the appeal to the distinction between norm conformity and blameworthiness could be used 
irresponsibly. For example, consider the surprising suggestion that in polite English society 
it’s a norm that one ought to belch in appreciation of a good meal. Of course, this putative 
norm faces apparent counterexamples: cases in which people who belch after a good meal are 
criticised and cases in which people who don’t are not criticised. Without any account of 
when one is blameless for a norm violation or blameworthy despite norm conformity, 
somebody could attempt to defend the existence of the putative belching norm by appeal to 
this distinction, chalking up the apparent counterexamples to the distinction between norm 
conformity and blameworthiness.  
Similarly, we need an account of blameless norm violation and blameworthy norm 
conformity in order to assess the argument for the pessimistic conclusion that, for any norm 
whatsoever, norm conformity and being blameless can come apart. The classic argument for 
the pessimistic conclusion proceeds from an epistemic claim, namely Williamson’s anti-
luminosity result, to the conclusion that, for all norms whatsoever, norm conformity and 
being blameless can come apart. But, any such argument implicitly relies on a bridging claim 
which connects the relevant result, here anti-luminosity, to the conclusion that norm 
conformity and being blameless can come apart. In other words, the argument implicitly 
relies on some account of blameless norm violation and blameworthy norm conformity. Thus, 
to assess both how defenders of the knowledge norm reply to particular counterexamples, as 
well as their more general pessimistic conclusion, we need an account of blameless norm 
violation and blameworthy norm conformity. In the rest of the paper, I examine this issue, 
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starting with an assessment of the argument from anti-luminosity to the pessimistic 
conclusion. 
 
3.  The pessimistic conclusion. 
There are a variety of ways in which one might violate a norm and yet be blameless. One 
might be exempt from a norm, or forced by another to violate it. Alternatively, one might be 
blameless for violating one norm if by violating it one conforms to a more important norm 
which overrides it. The argument from anti-luminosity to the pessimistic conclusion exploits 
a further way in which one might be blameless for violating a norm, namely due to the 
distinction between one’s perspective on whether one is conforming to the relevant norm, and 
whether one is in fact conforming to it. I will focus on this last possibility in the rest of this 
paper, assuming implicitly that the subject is not exempt from the relevant norm, not forced, 
and that the norm is not overridden by another norm.  
Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) defend the pessimistic conclusion by appeal to 
“non-transparency”, the claim that there is no condition such that we are always in a position 
to know whether it obtains (9). In more detail, non-transparency amounts to the view that, for 
any non-trivial condition, it’s possible that it obtains but one is not in a position to know that 
it obtains; and, it is possible that it does not obtain but one is not in a position to know that it 
does not obtain. As a result, they claim that there is no possibility of finding epistemic norms 
which are normatively satisfying:  
Intuitively, we expect epistemic norms to be normatively satisfying: that is, we expect 
them to track our intuitions about blameworthy and praiseworthy epistemic conduct. 
An epistemic norm that ties what one ought to do to a non-transparent condition (e.g. 
knowledge) is an epistemic norm that will not satisfy this basic desideratum. To 
construct an epistemic norm that is normatively satisfying, then, we require an 
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epistemic “ought” that is tied to only transparent conditions; unfortunately no such 
conditions plausibly exist. (28) 
Given that no non-trivial condition is transparent, the same conclusion would extend to norms 
in general. Indeed, Srinivasan (2015) argues that given that no non-trivial condition is 
transparent, there is no norm which does not allow for blameless norm violation2.  
 It seems that the basic form of Hawthorne and Srinivasan’s argument is to combine a 
certain epistemic result, namely non-transparency, with a bridging principle which connects 
that epistemic result to divergence between norm-conformity and blameworthiness to arrive 
at the general conclusion that there is no norm which aligns norm-conformity and whether 
one is blameless. In more detail, we can formulate their argument as follows:  
1. For any norm α iff β, it’s possible that β/not-β obtains but one is not in a position to 
know that. (Non-transparency.) 
2. If β/not-β obtains but one is not in a position to know that and one violates the norm 
(α iff β), then one violates the norm blamelessly; if β/not-β obtains but one is not in a 
position to know that and one conforms to the norm, one does so in a blameworthy 
way. (Bridging claim)  
3. So, for any norm, it’s possible that one violates the norm blamelessly or conforms to 
it in a blameworthy fashion.3  
                                                          
2 Srinivasan (2015) focuses on showing that every norm has cases of blameless norm 
violation. She argues that "if Anti-Cartesianism is true, then there are no norms that are 
always action guiding or that are never blamelessly violable" (285), where Anti-Cartesianism 
is just non-transparency (274). 
3 Srinivasan's argument is slightly more complex and goes through some sub-premises 
concerning the connection between control, luck and blamelessness. In more detail, she 
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 In assessing this argument, it’s important to bear in mind that, quite independently of 
this argument, we know that in many cases, norm conformity comes apart from whether one 
is blameworthy. So, the interest of the argument is in establishing a stronger conclusion than 
this, namely the universal claim that, for any norm whatsoever, norm conformity comes apart 
from whether one is blameworthy. However, I will argue that the original argument which 
appeals to anti-luminosity fails to establish this universal pessimistic conclusion and, further, 
that it is hard to reformulate the argument so as to establish the universal pessimistic 
conclusion. 
In assessing the original anti-luminosity argument, I will take it that Williamson 
(2000) has established the non-transparency premise (1). However, I will argue that the 
bridge principle (2) fails: not being in a position to know is not sufficient to make a violation 
blameless or to make conformity blameworthy. We can illustrate this by appeal to Gettier 
cases.4 Consider the following norm: call the boss if and only if the appointee is Etonian. 
                                                          
argues that given non-transparency, there is no norm such that a competent agent who knows 
the norm is in a position to know of every basic action available to her whether it would be in 
conformity with the norm. As a result, she claims that, for any norm, it's not always under 
one's control whether one's basic actions constitute norm violations, but is instead sometimes 
a matter of performance luck. Further, she claims that if one violates a norm through 
performance luck, then one is blameless (2015, section 5). Just as with the simpler argument 
considered in the main text, Gettier cases cause trouble for this more complex argument. We 
may accept that, in a Gettier case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent's action is a norm 
violation. But, it does not follow that she is blameless if she violates it. 
4 I use the standard description of a Gettier case as one involving a justified true belief which 
is not knowledge. Some (Sutton 2007, Littlejohn forthcoming, Williamson forthcoming) 
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Suppose that a subject is in a Gettier case with respect to the claim that the appointee is 
Etonian. She justifiably and truly believes that the appointee is Etonian on the basis of 
inference from a justified false belief that Jones will get the job and a justified true belief that 
Jones is Etonian. Thus, she is not in a position to know that the appointee is Etonian. 
Nonetheless, if she violates the norm by failing to call the boss she is not blameless. 
Similarly, if the subject violates the norm by calling the boss when it’s not the case that the 
appointee is Etonian, then it’s not sufficient to render her blameless that she is not in a 
position to know that the appointee is not Etonian. For, the subject could be in a Gettier case 
with respect to the proposition that the appointee is not Etonian: she could have a justified 
true belief that the appointee is not Etonian but not be in a position to know that. But if she 
calls the boss in such circumstances she is not blameless for violating the norm.5 
In a similar way, appeal to Gettier cases can be used to show that not being in a 
position to know is not sufficient to make conformity to a norm blameworthy. Suppose that a 
subject conforms to the norm by calling the boss in the circumstance that the appointee is 
Etonian. Further, suppose that the subject is not in a position to know that the appointee is 
                                                          
dispute this standard description, arguing that a belief is justified only if knowledge. 
However, nothing hangs on this description and Gettier cases equally undermine the anti-
luminosity argument for the pessimistic conclusion even on the description on which they 
merely involve having evidence for a true claim which is not knowledge. 
5 Other cases may also cast doubt on the bridging principle 2). Consider Sher’s (2009) case of 
a forgetful dog owner who leaves her pet dog in a sealed car on a hot day. Surely, she has 
violated a norm for looking after her pet dog and is blameworthy. That remains so even if, 
having clean forgotten the dog, she no longer knows, and is no longer in a position to know 
that she's left the dog in the car. 
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Etonian since she is in a Gettier case. In particular, she has a justified true belief that the 
appointee is Etonian but doesn’t know that. It wouldn’t follow that she is blameworthy for 
conforming to the norm. A similar chain of reasoning shows that even if a subject is in a 
Gettier case with respect to the claim that the appointee is not Etonian, it doesn’t follow that 
she is blameworthy for conforming to the norm by not calling the boss when the appointee is 
not Etonian. It seems that not being in a position to know is not sufficient to make norm 
violation blameless or norm conformity blameworthy. 
 It seems, then, that the original form of the argument from non-transparency to the 
pessimistic conclusion fails. To reinstate the argument, one needs to show that for any 
condition, β, which might figure in a norm α iff β, it’s possible that β (or not-β) obtains in 
circumstances C, such that 1) if one violates the norm when β (not-β) and C, one is 
blameless; and, 2) if one conforms to the norm when β (not-β) and C, one’s norm conformity 
is blameworthy. One might hope to reinstate the argument to the pessimistic conclusion using 
some epistemic condition other than the condition that one is not in a position to know. For 
example, we sometimes judge a subject blameless for violating a norm if she is ignorant that 
she is violating it. However, we will see that, for a range of epistemic conditions that one 
might use to restate the argument, the argument fails either at the first premise which records 
a certain kind of epistemic result or at the bridging premise which connects that result to 
divergence between norm-conformity and whether one is blameless. Let’s start by examining 
problems for the epistemic result. 
 
4.  Problems for the epistemic result. 
Suppose that one tries to reformulate the argument to the pessimistic conclusion by appeal to 
a variety of doxastic or epistemic properties such as lack of belief, justification/evidence to 
believe, or justified belief. For instance, one might notice that one sometimes judges a subject 
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blameless for a norm violation when she is ignorant that she is violating the norm. However, 
to use this kind of case to reinstate the universal pessimistic conclusion, it’s not enough to 
show that, for many conditions which can figure in norms, they can obtain while one is 
ignorant that they obtain. Instead, one needs to defend the universal claim that, for any 
condition which can figure in a norm, it can obtain despite one’s ignorance that it obtains. 
Alternatively, if the idea is that violating the norm (α iff β) by αing when not-β is blameless if 
one has justification to believe that β, then one needs to defend the universal result that, for 
any condition, it’s possible that the condition does not obtain even though one has 
justification to believe that it does obtain. However, it’s not clear how one would defend the 
needed universal result. In particular, Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument would be of no 
help. For, the anti-luminosity argument centrally turns on the safety condition for knowledge: 
that if one knows that p in a case α, then there is no nearby case, β, in which one fails to 
know.  
To see this, recall the general structure of the anti-luminosity argument (Williamson 
2000). We are to consider a subject who starts out feeling cold one morning and gradually 
becomes warmer. In particular, consider a case c in the middle of the spectrum between 
feeling cold and feeling warm which constitutes a borderline case of feeling cold. Even if, in 
c, the subject truly believes that she feels cold, she is not in a position to know this. For, there 
is a nearby case in which she would continue to believe that she feels cold even though she is 
not. Thus, even if, in c, she truly believes that she feels cold, her belief is not safe or 
knowledge. Given the way in which the anti-luminosity result depends on the safety 
condition, the result does not apply to any property which does not require a safety condition. 
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But, arguably6, none of the following epistemic conditions require safety: belief, justification 
to believe, justified belief etc. So, even if we could formulate an account of blameless norm 
violation using these epistemic notions, it’s not clear how we would establish the epistemic 
result which is supposed to generate the conclusion. 
Even though Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument does not extend to belief or 
justification, one might suggest that it is anyway independently plausible that, for any 
condition, it could obtain yet one not believe it obtains or it could obtain yet one justifiably 
believes it does not obtain. Certainly, we should grant that, for many conditions, this is true. 
However, to defend the pessimistic conclusion in full generality, the epistemic result from 
which the argument starts needs to be universal. For example, if the bridging premise 
employs the idea that lack of belief is sufficient for excuse, the epistemic result needs to take 
the following form: for any condition, β , β could obtain yet one not believe it obtain. 
Establishing any such universal claim is likely to be highly controversial. After all, some 
suggest that certain conditions are self-intimating, where a condition is self-intimating if 
whenever it obtains, one believes that it obtains. For example, some suggest that pain is self-
intimating. Similar difficulties affect the suggestion that for any condition β, β could obtain 
yet one believes falsely that it not obtain. For some suggest that certain beliefs are self-
verifying: for some p, if one believes that p, then p is true. For example, consider the belief 
that I’m now thinking. Some argue that whenever I form this belief, I thereby make it true 
                                                          
6 On the controversial knowledge view of justification, a belief is justified if and only if 
known, and so justified belief requires safety (e.g. Littlejohn, Sutton, Williamson). I set this 
view aside here since it would not help the defender of the pessimistic conclusion find an 
epistemic condition distinct from lack of knowledge with which to reinstate her argument. 
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(e.g. Burge). If that is right, then there are some conditions such that one cannot believe 
falsely that they obtain since, by believing they obtain, one makes it true that they obtain.  
Consider instead whether the argument could work by exploiting justification or 
evidence. On a traditional view, one can have justified false beliefs and misleading evidence 
about many things.7 However, it’s controversial whether, for every condition, p, whatsoever, 
one can have evidence/justification not-p, yet p; or evidence/justification that p, yet not-p. 
This issue has surfaced in an especially acute form in the debate over the possibility of 
epistemic akrasia. Titlebaum (2015) and Littlejohn (2015) have argued that one cannot have 
justified false beliefs about what rationality requires. Others have suggested that there are 
inter-level coherence requirements which would prevent certain combinations of beliefs 
being justified. In particular, some argue that even though one’s evidence can support both p 
and that one’s evidence does not support that p, one cannot be rational or justified in 
believing both that p and that one’s evidence does not support that p since 
rationality/justification requires certain inter-level coherence requirements (e.g. Christensen 
2007, Worsnip 2015). If that’s right, then for the norm, α iff one justifiably believes that p, 
one cannot be in the situation in which one justifiably believes that p and justifiably believes 
that one’s evidence does not support that p. While I don’t want to take a stand on these issues 
here, it’s worth recording that it is controversial whether, for every condition, p, it’s possible 
that p and yet one has evidence/justification/justified belief that not-p. As a result, it’s far 
from clear that one could easily defend the pessimistic conclusion by appeal to the suggestion 
that, for any condition whatsoever, it can obtain even though one has evidence supporting 
                                                          
7 Of course, those who hold that a belief is justified if and only if known reject the idea that 




that it does not obtain, or justification to believe that it does not obtain, or justified belief that 
it does not obtain.  
We’ve seen, then, that there is no easy substitute property for non-transparency to 
employ in the argument to the pessimistic conclusion. For, Williamson’s anti-luminosity 
argument centrally relies on the safety condition for knowledge. Thus, it does not extend to 
properties which do not require safety, such as belief or justification. Further, even if it is 
plausible that, for many conditions, β, β could obtain without one’s believing it, having 
justification to believe it, or one’s justifiably believing it, it’s far from clear that this is so for 
all conditions whatsoever. But only a universal claim would support the universal nature of 
the pessimistic conclusion, namely that for any norm whatsoever, norm-conformity comes 
apart from whether one is blameworthy. 
However, even setting aside these concerns about establishing the relevant epistemic 
result, concerns can be raised about whether the various candidate epistemic properties are 
sufficient for norm conformity to come apart from whether one is blameless. If they are not 
so sufficient, then even if the epistemic result could be established, it would fail to establish 
the pessimistic conclusion. But, as we will see in the next section, there are problems for each 
of the various candidate epistemic properties. 
 
5. Problems for the bridging claim. 
Earlier, we saw that not being in a position to know is not sufficient to make norm violation 
blameless nor norm conformity blameworthy. So, let’s now consider whether there are 
alternative bridging claims which link some epistemic or doxastic standing to blameless norm 
violation or blameworthy norm conformity. A first thought might be to formulate a bridge 
principle by appeal to the widely held view that factual ignorance can excuse norm violation. 
For instance, if a doctor kills a patient by unwittingly giving her a blood product 
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contaminated by a malevolent nurse, then we might judge the doctor blameless. While it is 
widely agreed that factual ignorance can excuse, it is much more controversial whether 
normative ignorance excuses.8 In particular, some doubt that normative ignorance, that is 
ignorance of norms, excuses norm violation. For example, consider a dictator’s son raised 
within the palace walls and never given a proper moral education. Even if he is ignorant of 
moral norms, it doesn’t follow that he is blameless when he, for example, orders the children 
of dissidents to be tortured in front of their parents and watches the scene with evident 
enjoyment. So, for the purposes of discussion, I will set aside normative ignorance, and focus 
wholly on factual ignorance. 
The kind of ignorance which most plausibly excuses norm violation is a justified false 
belief or a false belief supported by the evidence. For merely failing to believe some truth is 
not plausibly sufficient to excuse a norm violation. For instance, suppose that a gardener 
empties a bottle of herbicide into a river, thereby violating the norm: dispose of liquids in the 
river only if they are harmless.9 It would be no excuse if she does so while failing to truly 
                                                          
8 Some argue that blameless moral ignorance excuses just as blameless factual ignorance 
does, including Calhoun 1989, Rosen 2003 and 2004, Fitzpatrick 2008, Zimmerman 2008, 
Levy 2009. Others deny this including Harman 2011, Mason 2016 and Weatherson 
forthcoming. 
9 Here, I consider a norm which only specifies a necessary condition for appropriate action 
rather than a necessary and sufficient condition. Although I stated the original argument for 
the pessimistic conclusion with a bi-conditional norm, I take it that Hawthorne and Srinivasan 
want their pessimistic conclusion to also apply to one-way norms. This is particularly 
important in the context of the debate about the knowledge norm of assertion since some only 
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believe that the liquid is poisonous because she dogmatically persists in believing that the 
liquid is harmless despite reading the explicit warnings on the label. Further, it would be no 
excuse if she fails to believe truly that the liquid is poisonous because, as she realises, the 
evidence is inconclusive one way or the other so she suspends on the issue.  
While lack of belief does not provide a sufficient condition for blameless norm 
violation, it might seem more plausible that we can find such a condition by appeal to a 
justified false belief or a false belief supported by the evidence (see Peels 2010, Harman 
2011, Weatherson forthcoming).10 For instance, the gardener might be excused if she 
justifiably believes that the liquid is harmless on the basis of the information provided by the 
manufacturer. So, consider the idea that one is blameless for violating the norm (α only if β) 
by α-ing when not-β if one justifiably falsely believes that β; and blameworthy for 
conforming to the norm (α only if β) by α-ing when β if one justifiably falsely believes that 
not-β. 
Appeal to justified false belief looks initially promising for blameworthy norm-
conformity. For example, if the gardener has a justified false belief that some liquid is 
poisonous, then she would plausibly be blameworthy for pouring that liquid into the river, 
                                                          
defend the claim that knowledge is necessary for proper assertion rather than a bi-conditional 
version of the knowledge norm.  
10 Indeed, a great many of the examples used to suggest that not being in a position to know 
generates cases in which norm conformity comes apart from whether one is blameworthy 
involve having misleading evidence (see eg. Hawthorne and Srinavasan and 2013). Those 
who hold the knowledge view of justification on which a belief is justified only if known 
(e.g. Sutton, Williamson), would prefer the evidence formulation since they deny that there 
can be justified false beliefs. 
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even though this action conforms to the relevant norm. However, the suggested condition for 
blameless norm violation is less plausible. To see this, consider how much justification one 
needs in order to count as being justified tout court. On one possible view, one needs a 
maximal justification in order to count as being justified tout court. But, we will see that this 
makes the conditions for blameless norm violation implausibly tough. On an alternative view, 
in order to be justified, one’s degree of justification needs to exceed a threshold which is less 
than maximal. But, we will see that, on this threshold view, having a justified false belief is 
not sufficient for blameless norm violation. Thus, we will see that it is difficult to formulate a 
condition plausibly sufficient for a norm violation to be blameless by appeal to the notion of a 
justified false belief. This is problematic for the purpose of establishing the overall 
pessimistic conclusion. After all, the original pessimistic conclusion stated that, for any norm, 
whether one conforms to that norm comes apart from whether one is blameworthy in both 
directions: one can conform to it in a blameworthy way or violate it blamelessly.11 So, to 
establish the pessimistic conclusion we need not only a condition plausibly sufficient for 
blameworthy conformity but also a condition plausibly sufficient for blameless violation. So, 
even if appeal to justified false beliefs does provide a plausible account of blameworthy 
norm-conformity, if it doesn’t provide an account of blameless norm-violation, then it doesn’t 
establish the pessimistic conclusion. 
                                                          
11 Recall that Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) argue that no norms are normatively 
satisfying i.e. "track our intuitions about blameworthy and praiseworthy epistemic conduct" 
(28). They stress the problem of normative divergence facing norms: "they generate instances 
of both blameworthy right-doing and, conversely, virtuous wrongdoing"(20). Srinavasan 
(2015) argues that any norm gives rise to cases of blameless norm violation. 
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Let’s start by considering what degree of justification one needs in order for one’s 
justified false belief to excuse a norm violation. One possible answer is that one needs to be 
have the maximal level of justification for a claim in order for it to render a norm violation 
blameless. But, this suggestion has the implausible result that we are hardly ever excused for 
norm violations since, plausibly, there are very few claims with respect to which we have the 
maximal level of justification. Indeed, on certain assumptions, we can never have the 
strongest possible evidence for falsehoods. For example, some defenders of the knowledge 
norm of assertion hold that evidence is factive (e.g. Williamson). But, falsehoods can never 
entail truths. So, falsehoods can never have probability 1 on one’s evidence. Thus, on a 
factive view of evidence, one can never have the strongest possible amount of evidence for a 
falsehood.  
Given that requiring maximal justification is too demanding, it might be suggested 
that a norm violation is blameless if one’s degree of justification exceeds a high threshold of 
justification, where the threshold is less than the maximal amount. But, as soon as it is non-
maximal, then we seem to face a threshold problem: what level of justification is sufficient, 
and what makes that level non-arbitrary? To illustrate, suppose that we understand 
justification in terms of probability on the evidence. Then someone might suggest that the 
requisite level of justification is a probability on the evidence greater than .9. What fixes this 
as the required level rather than .8999, or .911? If the level required is arbitrary, then it makes 
whether one is blameless for a norm violation arbitrary. 
Further, wherever this level is fixed, then at least on a classic invariantist account of 
justification, it seems that justified false belief is not always sufficient for excuse. For 
example, suppose again that the required level of justification is probability on the evidence 
which exceeds .9. Even so, we can generate cases in which justification is insufficient for 
excuse. It would not excuse a teacher’s feeding a known to be peanut-allergic child peanut-
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containing curry that it was .9 likely that it didn’t contain peanuts. The problem generalises to 
any plausible high threshold less than 1. For any invariant threshold of probability on the 
evidence less than 1, we can imagine a situation in which the stakes are so high that meeting 
that threshold is not sufficient for excuse. (Of course, analogous reasoning would apply to the 
alternative idea that justification is not a matter of probability on the evidence but instead the 
reliability of the relevant belief-forming process. First, we don’t want to require maximal 
reliability for blameless norm violation, but only a sufficient threshold of reliability. But, 
second, on any invariant non-maximal threshold, there will be cases in which meeting that 
threshold is not sufficient for blameless norm violation.) 
One way to try to simultaneously solve both the threshold problem and the sufficiency 
problem would be to appeal to a shifty view about justification such as contextualism or 
pragmatic encroachment. According to such shifty views, whether a subject’s belief counts as 
justified depends not just on the level of her evidence but also the stakes. As the stakes get 
higher, she needs a higher level of evidence in order to count as justified. Thus, it might be 
suggested that in the peanut-case, even having .9 probability on the evidence that the candy 
does not contain peanuts is not sufficient for the subject to count as justified.12 While this 
                                                          
12 Someone might object that, at least on pragmatic encroachment, it’s not clear that the 
peanut case involves high stakes, as opposed to serious moral norm violation. According to 
pragmatic encroachment, the relevant stakes are the stakes for the subject of the epistemic 
attribution. But the fact that the situation is high stakes for the child does not entail that it is 
high stakes for the teacher. For instance, it's possible that a teacher has to decide what lunch 
to give to a known to be peanut-allergic child where the teacher doesn’t care about the child, 
nor about whether she does a morally wrong action, and can expect not to face any serious 
consequences for feeding the child peanut-containing food. In such circumstances, the level 
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suggestion would be congenial to defenders of shifty views, it would be very unappealing to 
those who find shifty views problematic. Thus, although shifty views offer a way of 
defending a bridging principle linking justification to believe that one’s not violating a norm 
with being blameless for violating it, it is not a solution which would be happily embraced by 
all. Thus, the argument to the pessimistic conclusion if filled out in this way would be very 
controversial. 
A defender of the pessimistic conclusion might attempt to repair the argument in two 
different ways. First, she might employ the claim that, for any norm, there is some degree of 
justification which would excuse violations of it. She might attempt to defend the pessimistic 
conclusion by combining this first claim with the second claim that for any norm (α iff β), 
and for any degree of justification d, one can have a justified false belief that β of degree d. 
However this reformulated argument employs a much stronger epistemic claim than the 
original formulation (namely that for any norm (α iff β) one can have a justified false belief 
that β). It’s not clear why we should endorse the stronger claim. The problems we 
encountered in section 4 for the original claim apply to the strengthened claim as well. 
Further, on certain views – such as Williamson’s account of evidential support--one cannot 
have the maximal degree of evidential support for a falsehood. Given his factive account of 
evidence, and that truths don’t entail falsehoods, a falsehood cannot have probability 1 on the 
evidence. Thus, the first strategy of repair looks unpromising. 
                                                          
of justification required for excusably feeding the child peanut-containing food would still 
intuitively be high, even if we cannot understand this in terms of the stakes for the teacher 
being high. To the extent that such cases are possible, we might conclude that pragmatic 
encroachment should be understood so that justification depends on the degree of wrongness 
of the relevant action as well as the stakes for the agent. 
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Second, the defender of the pessimistic conclusion might attempt to repair her 
argument by restricting her attention to low-stakes norm violations and arguing that justified 
false belief excuses low-stakes norm violations. For instance, she may suggest that: for any 
norm (α only if β), whenever it is not a serious matter whether that norm is violated, if the 
subject violates the norm by αing when not-β and has justification to believe that β, she is 
blameless. However, even if this revised principle is plausible, it could be used to support the 
pessimistic conclusion only in conjunction with the following epistemic result: for any norm, 
there are cases in which it is not very serious whether that norm is violated. However, it’s far 
from clear how we could show that the required epistemic result is true. In particular, certain 
norms seem in their nature to concern serious matters. This is the case with norms that 
prohibit torture or killing innocents except in certain special circumscribed situations. Given 
the significance of human life, it’s simply not clear how there can be non-serious violations 
of these norms. 
Let’s summarise the discussion so far. We started by examining the original argument 
for the pessimistic conclusion which appealed to a certain epistemic result in conjunction 
with a bridge principle to conclude that, for any norm, whether one conforms to that norm 
comes apart from whether one is blameless in both directions: one can conform in a 
blameworthy way or violate it blamelessly. The original argument appealed to the notion of 
not being in a position to know. We saw that that argument failed since even granting the 
epistemic result, the bridge principle is implausible. Not being in a position to know is neither 
sufficient for a norm violation to be blameless nor for norm conformity to be blameworthy. 
We then examined whether we could reformulate the argument by appeal to some other 
doxastic or epistemic condition, such as belief, justification to believe or evidence. This 
reformulation faced two main problems. First, the relevant epistemic result is harder to 
establish. Second, we faced problems formulating plausible bridge conditions. True, appeal to 
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justified false belief provides a condition plausibly sufficient for blameworthy norm 
conformity: if one’s conforms to the norm (α only if β) by αing when β and one’s evidence 
supports not-β, then one conforms in a blameworthy way. But, it’s much harder to appeal to 
the notion of justification to provide a condition plausibly sufficient for blameless norm 
violation. Without appeal to controversial shifty views, such as contextualism or pragmatic 
encroachment, one can have justification to believe that β, violate the norm (α only if β) by 
αing when not-β and still not be blameless. But unless we can formulate a plausible sufficient 
bridge principle for blameless norm violation as well as blameworthy norm conformity, then 
we cannot defend the original conclusion that, for any norm, whether one conforms to the 
norm comes apart from whether one is blameless in both directions. At best, we might be able 
to show that, for any norm, one can conform to it in a blameworthy way but not that, for any 
norm, one can violate it blamelessly. So, we cannot defend the original pessimistic 
conclusion in both directions. 
 
6. Habit. 
So far, the argument has focused on bridge principles using epistemic or doxastic conditions. 
But, it might be wondered if we could instead reformulate the bridge principles using other 
conditions. Indeed, some suggest that norm conformity can come apart from whether one is 
blameless because whether one conforms to a norm can come apart from whether one 
employs a good habit, that is a habit generally conducive to norm conformity, or to 
conforming to the relevant norm.  
For instance, Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) considers a subject who knows that p despite 
having higher-order evidence which suggests that she doesn’t know that p. If the subject 
asserts that p then she conforms to the knowledge norm of assertion but Lasonen-Aarnio 
suggests that she uses a bad habit and should thus be negatively evaluated. For even though 
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the evidence is misleading in this particular case, evidence is not typically misleading. Thus if 
the agent has a habit of ignoring evidence that she is not conforming to the knowledge norm 
of assertion, then this will generally tend to lead her to not conform to the knowledge norm. 
However, even if appeal to habits can plausibly provide an account of blameworthy norm-
conformity, it has more difficulty providing a plausible account of blameless norm violation. 
In particular, that one employs a habit which is conducive to norm-conformity is not 
sufficient to make a norm-violation blameless. For, even if one knows that the habit is 
generally conducive to conformity with the norm, it might leave open too high a chance that 
one is failing to conform on this occasion. For instance consider the following norm: shoot if 
and only if it’s an enemy plane. Even if in shooting a certain plane, one employs a habit 
which is generally conducive to shooting only enemy planes, this might leave open a 
significant chance that the relevant plane is in fact a passenger plane full of tourists going on 
holiday. That one knows that the habit is generally conducive to norm conformity would not 
necessarily render one blameless for shooting the jet out of the sky when one knew the risks. 
In general, any notion of a good habit as conducive to norm conformity but which is fallible 
is likely to be insufficient to render norm violations blameless when the stakes are high 
enough. For reasons similar to those discussed above, we can’t hope to avoid this problem by 
appeal to the idea that when it is not a serious matter whether one conforms to the norm, a 
good habit is sufficient for a norm violation to be blameless. For such a bridging claim would 
yield the pessimistic conclusion only when combined with the claim that every norm has 
cases in which it’s not a serious matter whether one conforms to it. But, we have already seen 
that that’s implausible. 
Someone might try and get around this first problem by suggesting that whether a 
habit counts as "good" or "bad" depends not merely on its reliability and so whether it is 
generally conducive to norm-conformity, but also how serious the relevant norm violation 
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would be. Thus, the idea might be that what counts as a "good habit" for conforming to the 
norm of shooting only enemy planes must be more reliable than what counts as a "good 
habit" for conforming to the norms of etiquette. Whatever the plausibility of this idea, it 
doesn't look as if it could be used in an argument for the pessimistic conclusion. It seems hard 
to ensure that the relevant bridging principle is true unless we understand a "good habit" as a 
habit whose employment ensures that one's action is blameless; and a “bad habit” as a habit 
whose employment ensures that one's action is blameworthy. But, if this is how the notion of 
a good habit is understood, then we don't so much have an argument for the pessimistic 
conclusion, but rather just an un-argued assertion of it. For, the supposed "argument" would 
start with the claim that, for any norm, whether one conforms to it can come apart from 
whether one employs a good habit or a bad habit, where a good habit is simply a habit 
employment of which renders one blameless; and a bad habit is simply a habit employment 
of which renders one blameworthy. 
A different way to try and get around difficulties in defending the pessimistic 
conclusion by appeal to the notion of habit would be to shift to a non-probabilistic notion of a 
good/bad habit. Some defenders of the knowledge norm employ a non-probabilistic notion of 
a bad habit to deal with cases in which a subject knows that β and conforms to the norm (α if 
and only if β) by αing but nonetheless seems blameworthy. If a subject knows that β, and 
knowledge is sufficient for evidence, then there is no epistemic chance that she is violating 
the norm (α if and only if β) by αing. Nonetheless, the subject might use a habit which is poor 
in the sense that it easily leads to disastrous consequences in other similar cases (Hawthorne 
and Stanley 2008, Lasonen-Aarnio 2010, Hawthorne and Srinivasan 2013). Even if the 
subject knows that β, she cannot always distinguish when β holds and when it doesn't. So, by 
αing when she believes that β, she is employing a habit which she may also employ when she 
believes that β but in fact not-β, resulting in her violating the relevant norm. For instance, 
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Hawthorne and Srinavasan (2013) appeal to this notion of a bad habit in explaining why an 
engineer who knows that she knows that the bridge only needs 10 struts is nonetheless 
blameworthy in ignoring the disagreement of a more junior but still competent engineer that 
more struts are required. Since the engineer cannot always distinguish when she knows and 
when she doesn’t, by dismissing the disagreement she is employing a habit which could 
easily lead to disastrous consequences in nearby cases. 
One might wonder if this non-probabilistic notion of a bad habit could be used to 
support the pessimistic conclusion. For instance, someone could appeal to the notion of a bad 
habit to try and argue that every norm allows for cases of blameworthy norm conformity as 
follows: 
1. For any norm, one could conform to that norm while employing a habit which 
could easily lead to disaster in similar cases. 
2. If one conforms to a norm while employing a habit which could easily lead to 
disaster in similar cases, then one is blameworthy. 
3. Thus, for any norm, one could conform to that norm and nonetheless be 
blameworthy. 
In considering the plausibility of this argument, one might first worry that 1) is not true for 
every norm since there are some norms which don’t seem disastrous to break. However, even 
if violating a norm is not in itself important, in some circumstances the consequences of 
violating it may nonetheless be very important. For instance, even if violating a norm of 
punctuation is not in itself important, in certain circumstances it could lead to disastrous 
consequences (perhaps, you have been kidnapped by a pedantic psychopath who swears to 
kill you if you make the least punctuation mistake). So, perhaps 1) is defensible by 
considering the further consequences of norm violations. Nonetheless, we might question the 
bridge principle 2).  
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At the heart of the bridge principle is the idea that employing a good/bad habit goes 
with one’s being blameless/blameworthy. However, the relevant notion of habit doesn’t fit 
our judgements about whether one is blameworthy. To see the problem, notice that, 
intuitively, there are cases in which someone violates a norm leading to very bad 
consequences but is nonetheless blameless. For example, suppose that an engineer violates 
the knowledge norm of belief. She believes that 12 struts are enough for a bridge, even 
though this belief is not knowledge since false. As a result, the bridge is not sturdy enough 
and quickly collapses causing many deaths. Nonetheless, we can imagine circumstances in 
which the engineer is nonetheless blameless: perhaps, she did all the calculations and 
doublechecking we could expect but some unknown and unpredictable problem had the result 
that 12 struts were not enough. In believing that 12 struts are enough it seems that she used a 
habit of belief formation. Furthermore, given human fallibility, she cannot always 
discriminate cases in which 12 struts enough and those in which that’s not the case. Indeed, 
it’s her failure to be able to perfectly discriminate cases in which 12 is enough and those in 
which it’s not which leads to disaster in this case. Thus, in the relevant sense, her norm 
violation manifests a bad habit: a habit that might lead to disaster. Furthermore, there are 
nearby cases in which it leads to disaster—indeed it leads to disaster in the actual case. Thus, 
appeal to the relevant notion of bad habit has the problematic consequence that she is 
blameworthy.  
In conclusion, it seems that appeal to neither a probabilistic nor a non-probabilistic 
notion of a bad habit provides a good defence of the pessimistic conclusion. 
 
7. An induction? 
We have seen that the original argument from anti-luminosity to the pessimistic conclusion 
fails and that it cannot be successfully reformulated by appeal to other doxastic or epistemic 
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conditions even the notion of habit. Of course, this is compatible with there being many cases 
in which whether one conforms to a norm comes apart from whether one is blameless. 
Indeed, a defender of the pessimistic conclusion might attempt to use this fact in a different 
argument than the deductive ones we’ve considered so far. In particular, she may suggest an 
inductive argument to the conclusion that, for any norm whatsoever, whether one conforms to 
it can come apart from whether one is blameless. Thus, she might argue as follows: 
1. For all norms so far considered, whether one conforms to a norm can come apart from 
whether one is blameless. 
2. Thus (by induction), for any norm whatsoever, whether one conforms to it can come 
apart from whether one is blameless. 
This inductive argument faces problems. First, the first premise is not established merely by 
noting that, in many cases, whether one conforms to a norm can come apart from whether one 
is blameless. Rather, it would need to be demonstrated that for all norms considered so far, 
one can violate them blamelessly and conform to them in a blameworthy way. Second, and 
more importantly, the induction would be undermined if we have reason to doubt that we can 
generalise the kind of explanation of why, in cases so far considered, norm-conformity can 
come apart from whether one is blameless. However, when we start to consider the different 
reasons why norm-conformity can come apart from whether one is blameless, these reasons 
often fail to generalise to all norms whatsoever. In particular, we will see that many of the 
explanations of why the violation of a norm governing action may be blameless don’t easily 
apply to norms of belief. 
It is standard to suggest that the violation of a norm governing action may be 
blameless if that norm is overridden by another norm, or the violation involved maximising 
expected utility or if violating the norm does not exhibit bad will. For instance, a failure to 
meet a friend for lunch as promised may be blameless if overridden by a more important 
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norm (to save the life of a drowning child), or if done without bad will (e.g. my watch is 
running slow and I don’t notice I’m running late). And it is sometimes suggested that a 
failure to maximise actual value can be excused if one maximises expected value. But these 
kinds of reasons why a norm violation may be blameless fail to extend easily to violations of 
the norm of belief. It is not clear how to apply the notion of a good or bad will to violations of 
the norm for belief. For instance, if I fall for the gambler’s fallacy in concluding that the next 
coin will be heads, I might nonetheless be blameworthy even if in no sense was my belief the 
product of bad will. Further, appeal to overriding norms or maximising expected value 
doesn’t obviously render violation of the norm for belief blameless. On a standard view, the 
norm of belief is not overridden either by norms of prudence or morality. Instead, the norm of 
belief is incommensurable with the norms of prudence and morality (e.g. Kelly 2013). Thus, 
the standard view about Pascal’s Wager is that I have a prudential reason to believe in God 
against the evidence and an epistemic reason not to do so where these are incommensurable. 
Relatedly, that believing in God against the evidence would maximise expected value does 
not make the violation blameless. Indeed this conclusion remains true even if we restrict 
expected value to expected epistemic value. In a variant of Pascal’s Wager, suppose that the 
Demon promises that if you believe that p he will reward you with outstanding epistemic 
abilities and conducive conditions for their use whereas if you don’t, he will ensure that you 
have poor epistemic abilities and that conditions are not conducive. Even if believing that p 
would maximise expected epistemic value, if there is no evidence for p, one is nonetheless 
epistemically blameworthy in believing that p. Thus, maximising even expected epistemic 
value is not enough to make a violation of the norm for belief blameless.13 
                                                          
13 One might wonder whether Williamson's account of excusable norm violation can be used 
to defend the argument to the pessimistic conclusion. On his account, one is excusable for a 
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In conclusion, it’s far from clear that one could mount an inductive argument to the 
pessimistic conclusion from everyday cases in which norm conformity comes apart from 
whether one is blameless. For when we consider the different kinds of explanations why 
norm conformity can come apart from whether one is blameless, many of these explanations 
do not generalise to all norms whatsoever. This undermines the idea that we can easily infer 
from the observation that norm conformity regularly comes apart from whether one is 
blameless to the conclusion that, for any norm whatsoever, norm conformity comes apart 
from whether one is blameless.  
 
8. Blame and replying to counterexamples. 
Despite the problems facing arguments to the pessimistic conclusion, norm-conformity often 
does not align with blamelessness. As a result, the failure of arguments to the pessimistic 
conclusion still leaves open the possibility of defending some suggested norm against 
counterexample by appealing to the idea that norm conformity can come apart from 
blamelessness. In the light of our discussion then, let us examine whether putative 
counterexamples to the knowledge norm of assertion can be deflected by appeal to the way in 
which norm conformity comes apart from being blameworthy. 
                                                          
norm violation if one does what someone who is disposed to conform to that norm would do 
in the circumstances. Employing this to defend the pessimistic conclusion would involve 
defending 1) for any norm, one can violate it yet do what someone who is disposed to 
conform to that norm would do in the circumstances; and 2) whenever that occurs, one 
blamelessly violates the norm. While 1) might seem plausible, it's not entirely clear how to 
prove it. Further, I raise problems for 2) in Brown forthcoming. 
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First, let’s consider examples in which, intuitively, it’s fine for the subject to assert 
that p even though she doesn’t know that p, such as Gettier cases and cases in which the 
subject falsely but justifiably believes that p. The standard way for defenders of the 
knowledge norm to deal with such cases is to say that they involve a blameless violation of 
the knowledge norm. In order to show that this appeal to the distinction between being 
blameless and norm-conformity is not ad hoc, it is preferable if the defender of the 
knowledge norm can appeal to a general condition sufficient for blameless norm violation. 
Our earlier discussion cast doubt on several putative such conditions, including appeal to not 
being in a position to know. But, we did find one plausible such condition: if one violates the 
norm (α iff β) by αing when not-β where it’s not a very serious matter whether one violates 
the norm and one justifiably believes that β, then one’s violation is blameless. Of course to 
apply this condition, the putative violations of the knowledge norm of assertion need to be 
not very serious. However, that seems plausible. Or, at least it seems that the best kinds of 
examples to cast doubt on the necessity of knowledge for assertion involve low-stakes 
situations.  
To see this, compare two different putative counterexamples to the necessity of 
knowledge, one low stakes and one high stakes. In both cases, I visited the bank several 
weeks ago and saw that it was open on a Saturday. As a result, I believe that the bank is open 
on Saturday and take it that this belief is knowledge. In the low-stakes version of the case, a 
friend casually asks me about the bank’s opening hours explaining that since her business is 
non-urgent, she would prefer to go on Saturday if the bank’s open then rather than wait in the 
long queue on Friday. In this case, it seems fine for me to reply by saying “Yes the bank is 
open on a Saturday” even though, as it turns out, what I said is false since the bank has 
recently unexpectedly changed its hours. By contrast, in the high-stakes case, my friend 
makes it clear to me that it’s a high-stakes matter for her whether the bank is open on 
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Saturday because of the urgency with which she needs to pay money into her account. In this 
high-stakes case, it would not seem fine for me to say “Yes the bank is open on a Saturday” 
without qualification. Instead, I should have said something like “Well, I was there a couple 
of weeks ago and it was open, but I guess you better check”. Similar points hold for a variant 
case in which I’m instead in a Gettier case in which I justifiably and truly believe that the 
bank is open on Saturday on the basis of the recent visit although I fail to know because many 
local businesses have recently changed their hours although the bank has not. 
It seems, then, that a defender of the necessity of knowledge for assertion could use 
the earlier discussion to draw on a plausible sufficient condition for blameless norm violation 
in attempting to deal with putative counterexamples in which a subject doesn’t know yet 
seems fine to assert. The defender will say that, in these cases, the subject violates the 
knowledge norm but is blameless because the violation is not a very serious matter and she 
justifiably believes that she knows. Of course, to point out that the defender of the necessity 
of knowledge for assertion can make this move is not to say that it is fully satisfactory. For 
some have argued that in such cases it is problematic to say that the subject is merely excused 
for her assertion rather than fully justified. I do not attempt to adjudicate that issue here, but 
rather simply point out that the defender of the necessity of knowledge for assertion can 
attempt to deal with such cases by appeal to the notion of blameless norm violation. 
Now consider putative counterexamples to the sufficiency of knowledge for being in a 
good enough epistemic position for assertion. In these cases, one does know the relevant 
proposition but it nonetheless seems problematic for one to assert it. Defenders of the 
knowledge norm would like to deal with such cases by appeal to the idea that one can 
conform to a norm and nonetheless be blameworthy. In some of these cases, they can appeal 
to the plausible principle concerning blameworthy norm conformity defended above (S5): if 
one conforms to the norm (Α if and only if β) by doing Α when β and one justifiably believes 
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that not-β, then one is blameworthy for conforming. In some putative counterexamples to the 
sufficiency direction of the knowledge norm for assertion, one knows that p although one’s 
evidence suggests that one does not, say because one has misleading evidence that not p, or 
misleading evidence that the process which produced the belief that p is unreliable, or 
misleading evidence that one’s evidence does not support that p etc. For example, some 
suggest that in a long deduction in which one comes to believe the conclusion by competent 
deduction from known premises, one’s belief in the conclusion constitutes knowledge despite 
the fact that one knows one has likely made a mistake given the length of the inference and so 
likely doesn’t know the conclusion. In asserting the conclusion one in fact conforms to the 
knowledge norm of assertion even though one has justification to believe that one is not 
conforming. The defender of the knowledge norm of assertion would claim that this is a case 
of blameworthy norm conformity. 
There remain a range of putative counterexamples to the sufficiency of knowledge for 
assertion which don’t have this structure including Lackey’s second-hand knowledge case 
and the high-stakes cases. In Lackey’s case, it seems problematic for the consultant to assert 
straight out that the patient has cancer even though she knows this, given that she learned it 
from a junior colleague and she hasn’t even looked at her notes. In this case, it still seems 
problematic for the consultant to assert that the patient has cancer even if she justifiably 
believes that she does know that the patient has cancer. Similarly, in Brown’s surgical case, it 
can seem problematic for a speaker to assert that p even if she knows that p and knows that 
she knows that p.  
In dealing with putative counterexamples to a knowledge norm in which a speaker 
knows and knows that she knows, some attempt to appeal to habits. Earlier, I cast doubts on 
whether appeal to habit could provide a satisfactory account of blameless norm violation. So, 
the defender of the knowledge norm of assertion might instead try to deal with such cases by 
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appeal to the idea that some norm overrides the norm of assertion. For example, it may be 
suggested that, in Lackey’s case, there is some kind of professional norm according to which 
the consultant shouldn’t assert straight out that the patient has cancer if she hasn’t even 
looked at her notes. It’s far less clear that all the high-stakes cases can be dealt with in the 
same way. For, they need not all involve special professional norms. For instance, in the 
affair case, there is no professional relationship governing the assertion. While one might 
think that there are certain special norms governing the relations between friends, it looks as 
if we can set up a variant affair case in which the informant is not a friend and so has no 
special such relations. 
In sum, then, the discussion of the pessimistic conclusion has helped clarify when 
someone can reasonably attempt to defend the knowledge norm of assertion by appeal to the 
idea that blamelessness can come apart from norm conformity. Some defenders of the 
knowledge norm of assertion have tried to deal with putative counterexamples by appeal 
either to lack of a position to know or appeal to habits. In fact, neither of these is satisfactory. 
Instead, it seems that they need to appeal either to evidence about whether the relevant 
condition which figures in the norm is satisfied, or the norm being overridden by rival norms. 
 
8.  Conclusion. 
I have been discussing the attempt to defend the knowledge norm of assertion by appealing to 
the idea that whether one conforms to a norm can come apart from whether one is blameless. 
This idea has been appealed to in responding to putative counterexamples to the knowledge 
norm of assertion. In addition, defenders of the knowledge norm have endorsed the 
pessimistic conclusion that, for any norm whatsoever, whether one conforms to it can come 
apart from whether one is blameless. As a result, defenders of the knowledge norm claim that 
it is no objection to the knowledge norm that it allows norm conformity to come apart from 
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whether one is blameless since, they say, every norm does so. I’ve challenged the argument 
to the pessimistic conclusion. Rejecting the pessimistic conclusion is, of course, compatible 
with accepting that norm-conformity often comes apart from whether one is blameless. So the 
rejection of the pessimistic conclusion still allows the defender of the knowledge norm to 
deal with putative counterexamples by invoking the distinction between norm-conformity and 
being blameless. However, the discussion of the pessimistic conclusion illuminated the 
conditions under which it is reasonable to claim that norm conformity comes apart from 
blamelessness, and so when it is legitimate to appeal to the distinction between norm-
conformity and blamelessness in dealing with counterexamples to one’s favoured norm.  
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